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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FqR REVIEW
May
contract

an employer
and

then hold

wrongfully

terminate

the employee

completing performance under the contract?

an

employment

responsible

for not

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
There are no authorities which appellant believes to be
directly dispositive of any of the issues in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action to determine the rights of the parties
with

respect

Helicopters

to

11,445 shares of stock

pursuant

in Rocky Mountain

to the terms of a contract that was

wwrongfully terminated by respondent.
Course of Proceedings Below
The case was tried on March 11, 1987r before The Honorable
Boyd L. Park, Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah
County, State of Utah. (R. 290)
On May 12, 1987, the district court in a memorandum decision
held that a consulting agreement between plaintiff and defendant
was wrongfully terminated by defendant.
held

that despite

the wrongful

plaintiff must nonetheless return
to defendant. (R. 300)

The district court also

termination

by defendant,

11,445 shares of Company stock

This stock constituted a material portion

of the consideration which plaintiff was to receive pursuant to
the agreement.
The order incorporating the lower court's decision was
entered on June 23, 1987. (R. 303-4)
of Appeal on July 23, 1987. (R. 305-A)

2

Plaintiff filed his Notice

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In January,

1981, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Richard

Smith

(hereinafter "Smith") entered into an employment contract with
Defendant-Respondent
"Rocky Mountain").

Rocky Mountain Helicopters

(hereinafter

The primary negotiator £or Rocky Mountain was

its acting President, Jim Burr (hereinafter "Burr"). (Tr. 17)
The initial contract was in all bractical aspects an
employment contract whereby Smith was to ac*f as Vice President of
Finance in exchange for a salary and incentive bonus.
One of the primary duties of Smith under the employment
contract was to locate a buyer and negotiat^ a sale of all of the
stock and/or assets of Rocky Mountain to a third party.

(R. 291)

However, as Smith attempted to perform hi^ obligations, he was
repeatedly hampered by the actions of Burr and other Rocky
Mountain officers.

First, Rocky Mountain qecretly issued 58,000

shares of Rocky Mountain stock to Burr anci his brother thereby
diluting the interest of all other shareholders, including Smith.
By reason of Smith's objections, the new i$sue of stock to Burr
was cancelled.

(Tr. 43-44) However, the transaction was

distracting

hampered

obligations.

and

Smith's efforts

to perform

his

Second, when Smith successfully performed his

primary duties and obtained a Letter of Intent from a buyer (the
buyer was called Offshore Logistics Company) commiting to the
purchase of all of the stock of Rocky Mountain (Tr. P-9),
Burr suddenly changed his mind and refused to pursue the stock
sale.

(Tr. 46-50)

Finally, despite Smithfi attempts to perform

his obligations, Burr attempted

to unilaterally

amend

the

employment agreement by limiting Smith's authority and thereby
impairing his ability to perform. (Ex. P-ll)
Rocky Mountain's repeated interference with Smith's performance caused a significant dispute to arise between the
parties. (R. 294) However, the parties succeeded in compromising
their differences

by preparing

new agreements which were

designated as a "consulting agreement" and an "escrow agreement".
(Tr. 109)

The escrow agreement specifically stated that all

prior agreements were superceded and that the new agreements
constituted the sole agreements between the parties.
& P-14)

(Exs. P-13

It is the consultation agreement and escrow agreement

that are the subject matter of this litigation.
Before summarizing the terms of the consulting and escrow
agreements, it should be noted that pursuant to the prior
employment agreements, Smith was issued 11,445 shares of Rocky
Mountain stock as partial consideration for services under the
prior agreements.

(Ex. P-7)

Under the new Consulting Agreement, Smith was to be employed
by Rocky Mountain for the period of one year.

His principal

assignment was to sell the company or raise equity funding.
Smith, in turn, agreed to place his 11,445 shares of Rocky
Mountain stock, (Cert. #103) in escrow.
memorialized

in a writing

dated

This agreement was

February

15, 1984, which

consisted of a Consulting Agreement prepared by Smith and Burr
and an Escrow Agreement prepared by Rocky Mountain's attorney,

4

Jerry Thorn.

The actual signing of the Escrow Agreement was

February 27, 1984.

(Ex.s P-13 & P-14)

Under the Consulting Agreement, Smith's principal assignment involved activities towards the goal ot either selling Rocky
Mountain or adding additional equity to the company.

He would

also act as an agent of Rocky Mountain in his efforts to raise
equity capital and function as a financial or corporate planning
advisor to Burr and Rocky Mountain in whatever areas they might
see fit.
The consulting agreement provided theit for his consulting
services, Smith would receive consideration in the amount of
$275.00 per day or $137.50 per half day for the time that Smith
spent rendering consulting services for th^ Company.

Smith was

also to receive the benefit of having his medical and dental
insurance paid for by the Company and continued life insurance
and associated health insurance.
Under the consulting agreement, Smith received his income
taxes prepared for the 1983 tax year, $1,000.00 worth of spousal
travel upon approval, use of the Xerox machines and use of the
Watts lines for personal use only.

Smith wa^ given an Oldsmobile

automobile and four new tires for the car in I exchange for accrued
vacation, sick time and separation benefits. Smith was to receive
50 gallons of gasoline per month and an agreement was provided
for the exchange of Smith's receivables from the Windgate Oil for
a Suburban automobile. (Ex. P-13)
The Escrow Agreement, which is dated February 17, 1984, pro5

vided that the was to be understood by Rocky Mountain and Smith,
that this Escrow Agreement superceded all prior agreements and
was the sole agreement

between

the parties governing

the

disposition of stock. (Ex. P-14)
The Agreement also provided as follows:
If, at any time during the one-year from the
date of this agreement, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
HELICOPTERS, INC., is sold to a third party,
or parties, either by virtue of a majority of
its assets being purchased, or, in the
alternative, any public or private sale of
its stock or the stock of any subsidiary
takes place, then in that event, the shares
of stock represented by the certificates
deposited herewith will be returned to
Richard S. Smith; provided that if any
negotiation for the sale of assets or stock
have begun prior to the expiration of one
year from the date hereof, that result in
such a sale, then and in that event, such
sale will be considered to have occurred
within the one year previously mentioned
herein.
Provided further that in the event the conditions described herein do not occur within
one year from the date of this agreement,
then stock represented by Certificate #
will be returned to ROCKY MOUNTAIN
HELICOPTER, INC.
During the latter portion of 1983, there was a crash of one
of Rocky Mountain's insured helicopters.

Pursuant to an exist-

ing agreement between the shareholders, the insurance proceeds
were required to be distributed to some of the shareholders in
accordance with their proportionate shares.
was accomplished in early 1984. (Tr. 152)

This disbursement
Later, the company

requested that the shareholders return their proportionate share
of the insurance proceeds.

Burr became upset with Smith when

6

Smith refused to return the money.

(Tr. 14|9)

As a result of this argument concerning the ownership of the
insurance proceeds from the helicopter ctfash,
sued Smith on April 16, 1984.

Rocky Mountain

Three days later, on or about

April 19, 1984, the suit was settled.

Baped on this law suit,

and other factors, the relationship between Rocky Mountain and
Smith was strained. (R. 298)
On March 4, 1984, Smith officially resigned as a Director of
Rocky Mountain Helicopters.

In his formal letter, Smith stated:

"this no way affects my availability and willingness to continue
to serve under the Consulting Agreement in areas that are deemed
appropriate, and particularly with respect v° efforts to sell the
Company or equity therein". (Ex. D-27)
On April 23, 1984, Smith's Consulting Agreement with Rocky
Mountain Helicopters was terminated by Burr as president of Rocky
Mountain. (Ex. P-20)

The lower court specifically found that

this termination by Rocky Mountain was wrongful (R. 299-300)
This case was submitted to the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park.
The lower court held that there was a valiii employment contract
between plaintiff and defendant. (R. 29<J)

The lower court

further held that Rocky Mountain had breached the contract by
wrongfully terminating Smith, and, as such, ISmith was entitled to
Judgment against the defendant Rocky Mountain as follows:
a)

$600.00 for gasoline benefit

b.

$2,699.55 for medical and insurance expenses the
plaintiff incurred during the term! of the Consulting Agreement.
7

Notwithstanding this holding, the Court held that Rocky
Mountain was entitled to the return of the 11,445 shares of
Company stock inasmuch as the Consulting Agreement and Escrow
Agreement provided for the return of stock in the event the
Company was not sold or a public or private sale of equity was
not effected.

(R. 299-300)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This appeal requests this Court to examine the internal
consistency of the lower court's decision in this case.

The

lower court held that the consulting contract was wrongfully
terminated by Rocky Mountain and, at the same time, held that
Smith was responsible for not completing performance under the
contract and thereby obligated to return to Rocky Mountain the
11,445 shares of stock held pursuant to the escrow agreement.
This decision should be overruled

and the shares of stock

returned to Smith.
The party prevented from performing may be treated as though
he had performed.
performing

In the present case, Smith was prevented from

his contractual obligations by reason of Rocky

Mountain's wrongful termination.

Therefore, Rocky Mountain

should not benefit from its breach of the employment contract and
the 11,445 shares of stock should be returned to Smith.
A.

All parties to a contract are obliged to proceed

in good
contract.

faith and cooperate in the performance of the
One party to a contract cannot, by willful act

or omission, make it difficult or impossible for the other
8

party to perform.
B.

When an employer and an employee have entered into

an employment contract for a definite period of time, the
employer may terminate or discharge ar^ employee only upon a
showing of good cause for said termination.

The lower court

specifically determined that Rocky Mountain's termination of
the consulting agreement was wrongful.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE A PARTY CAUSES A BREACH OR NON+PERFORMANCE OF
A CONTRACT, HE CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES FOfc NON-PERFORMANCE.
THE PARTY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING MAY BE TREATED AS THOUGH
HE HAD PERFORMED
There can be no breach of a contract on the part of one
whose performance is prevented or rendered impossible by the
conduct of the other party.
performing
perfomed.

The party wjio is prevented from

may be treated or considered

as though he had

17A C.J.S. Sec. 468; See Gibbs v.| Whelan, 239 P.2d 727

(N.M. 1952)

Weaver v. Williams, 317 P.id

1108 (Ore. 1957);

Bewick v. Mechan, 156 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1945); [Pacific Venture Corp.
v. Huey, 104 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1940); Overton vj. Vita-Food Corp. 210
P.2d 757 (Cal. 1949)
In Gibbs, the New Mexico Supreme Cburt found that the
parties entered

into an agreement wherein defendant hired

plaintiff to perform certain work.

Defendanjt subsequently failed

to line up the work for plaintiff and ther^ were intervals when

9

the plaintiff could not perform any work, but was still ready,
able and willing to perform.

The New Mexico Court held that the

defendant having voluntarily failed to line up work for plaintiff
thus preventing him from fulfilling his agreement, would not be
permitted to deny liability.
Smith's situation is very similar to that of the plaintiff
in Gibbs.

During late 1983, and after the consulting agreement

was signed, Smith was ready, willing and able to work for Rocky
Mountain.

Smith testified that he contacted Rocky Mountain and

made himself 30*teilable for the consulting work, and kept Rocky
Mointain informed of his activities.

However, Rocky Mountain

prevented him from meeting with investors from New York, who were
working on the equity sale of the company.

The testimony estab-

lishing these facts is quoted in the Addendum attached to this
brief.
Rocky Mountain prevented Smith from carrying out his duties
under the consulting agreement, even during the time prior to his
wrongful termination.

Because of this prevention, Smith should

be treated as if he performed his part of the agreement and the
escrowed stock should be returned to Smith.
Any conditions which

the

facts show might

have been

performed by him, it will be assumed would have been performed if
the conduct of the promisor was such as to preclude the possibility of performance. 5 Williston on Contracts Sec. 677A at 233.

The facts in this case show that Smith had accomplished
10

virtually all assignments that he was giv^n by Rocky Mountain.
(R. 291) At the time immediately prior to his termination, Smith
continued his negotiations with Offshore T-ogistics, with regard
to the sale of Rocky Mountain (Tr. 217).

Thus, it should be

assumed that Smith's duties under the contract would have been
performed, if Smith had not been wrongfully terminated by Rocky
Mountain.
Rocky Mountain should not, as a matter of law, be able to
invoke Smith's nonperformance as a defense to Rocky Mountain
returning the stock.

See Fisher v. John^un, 525 P.2d 45 Utah

1974); Cummings v. Neilson, 42 Utah 157, 12p P.619 (1912).
A.

All parties who enter into a contract [have an obligation to

cooperate and perform in good faith.
The lower court held that Smith and Rocky Mountain had
entered into a valid contract. (R. 306) On<te a contract has been
created, the duty of good faith will be implied.
Section 205, Restatement (2d), Contracts (1981) provides as
follows:
Every contract imposes upon each partV a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.
Comment (a) sates in part:
"Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and
consistency with the justified expectations of the
other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct
characterized as involving "bad faith" because they
violate community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness."
This duty to proceed in good faith anc^ to cooperate in the
11

performance of the contract has been accepted by this Court.

See

Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982); Weber Meadow-View
Corp. v. Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1978).
In the instant case, Smith fulfilled his duty to perform in
good faith and cooperate.

Smith was quite successful in his

employment in the principal areas which he had been assigned.
(R.291)

In addition to restructuring Rocky Mountain's financial

position, restructuring Rocky Mountain's arrangement with their
preferred shareholders, and refinancing the Teacher's Insurance
Fund, Smith began doing consultation work with the Bill Finley
group on the behalf of Rocky Mountain. (Tr. 180) Burr, the
president of Rocky Mountain, told Smith that perhaps a consulting
agreement with the Bill Finley group would be a good idea. (Tr.
180-81)

Smith continued this consultation work with Finley

throughout 1983-4.
Throughout the Fall and Winter of 1983, Smith continued to
cooperate and perform his duties under the contract in good
faith.

In October of 1983, a letter of intent for the sale of

Rocky Mountain to Offshore Logistics was negotiated, and ratified
by the Board of Directors at a meeting on November 15, 1983. (R.
295)
However, towards the latter part of 1983, as a result of
differences regarding corporate policy, a rift arose between Burr
and Smith. (R. 295)
Mountain

began

cooperation.

to

At this point in time, Burr and Rocky
breach

their

duty

of

good

faith

and

On April 23, 1984, Rocky Mountain made the final
12

breach by wrongfully terminating Smith's consulting agree-ment.
(R. 300)
B.

Wrongful termination by an employer constitutes a breach of

the employment contract and excuses, further performance by the
employee.
The lower court found from the factjs of this case, that
there were several instances that conflicts arose between Smith
and Burr.

The problems began toward the latter part of 1983,

when as a result of differences regarding corporate policy, a
rift arose between Burr and Smith. (R. 2|94)
Rocky Mountain helicopter crashed.

At this time, a

As a result of this accident,

insurance proceeds were disbursed to Smith ^nd others employed by
Rocky Mountain.
(Tr. 152)

These disbursements took place in early 1984.

Smith refused to return his pdrtion of the proceeds

and Rocky Mountain filed a law suit against Smith on April 16,
1984.

The law suit was settled on or ^bout April 19, 1984.

Because of this suit and other factors, th£ relationship between
Burr and Smith was left strained. (R. 298).

In fact, Burr was

quite angry with the settlement of the law suit. (Tr. 68)

Three

days after the settlement of the suit, Buri^, acting as President
of Rocky Mountain, terminated Smith.

At thfe time of termination,

only two months of the twelve month perioq allowed for Smith to
find a buyer for the company had expired.
The lower court held that said termination was wrongful.
(R. 299)

And at the same time, the loWer court found that,

despite termination of the contract, Smit}h was not completely
13

frustrated and prevented from finding a buyer for the Company
within the one year time period stated in the contract.

These

two findings are in direct conflict with each other.

If an

employer discharges an employee, the employer must meet the
burden of justifying

such discharge. See Chiodo v. General

Waterworks Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 425, 413 P.2d 891 (1966)

In

the present case, the Court found that that burden was not met
and that Smith had been wrongfully discharged

(R. 299).

The

lower court then held that Smith had been wrongfully discharged
only in relation to certain items.
as a matter of law.

This decision was erroneous

Once a party has been wrongfully discharged,

there is a breach of the employment contract and the good faith
standard.
1983).

See Mitford v. de La sala, 666 P.2d

1000 (Alaska

This good faith standard was breached by Rocky Mountain

and they should not be entitled to benefit from the breach.

The

lower court by allowing Rocky Mountain the return of the stock
allowed the breaching party to benefit.

As a matter of law, this

decision should be overruled.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff requests that this case be
reversed and judgement be entered entitling the return of the
11,445

shares

of Rocky Mountain

plaintiff.

14

Helicopter

stock

to the

DATED this 15th of November, 1987.
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ADDENDUM
Q.
You have also heard some testimony with regard to
availability, did you ever try and coptact Rocky Mountain
Helicopters to make yourself available?
A. Yes, I offered to as I think I testified before. I
offered to meet with the consultants who were coming in
from New York. I was just not allowed to.
Q.
Do you remember were there any [messages left at
your home that Mr. Burr was trying to get a hold of
you?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recall - A. And those messages had to do wi"th the helicopter
situation. There was never a single message either at
my home where my wife stays a hundred per cent of the
time or at the office in California where I was doing
the consulting work where there was someone there at
the phone all of the time. There was never a single
contact to me to ask for assistance ir> the consulting.
Q.
How many contacts were there with regard to this
helicopter problem?
A. Half a dozen.
Q. And this would all be during the [first, two, three
four weeks of the consulting Agreement?
A. Yes it was, yes four or five week?.
Q. Finally would you explain what ydu were doing with
the Asher Finley Company what your assignment was and
when you went there and at who's request , etc.
A.
Bill Finley had been the general partner on our
blade development program and also ijn an oil and gas
program which I helped Jim put together, Windgate Oil
and he was invited to sit on our board, He subsequently invited me to sit on their boardi. He was a very
capable man. Had been a senior partner in Arthur Young
& Company but was an alcoholic. And they needed some
help from time to time when he was out of commission.
Q.

Can I see the last exhibit that I|have?
16

Thank you.

I will show you has been marked as Exhibit No. 28 would
you identify that and tell me what it is?
A. Yes this is the November letter to Jim Burr that I
wrote to just kind of updating him on my status with
Bill Finley and indicating that there were some
problems that I would be spending some time on.

Q. Did you also make verbal reports to him as to what
you were doing with that company?
A. From time to time particularly as they had impact
on the Windgate Oil matter and the helicopter blade
program.
Q. Now the last paragraph of this said that I would
suggest that we proceed to determine exactly what kind
of time requirements this commitment would impose on me
but appears that such time requirements might become a
problem, I would like to discuss that with you at that
time, did he ever respond to that request?
A. Not really.
Q.
A.

But he was kept informed of your activities?
Yes.

Q. And this was in November of 1983 four months before
the Consulting Agreement?
A. That is correct.
Q. That is all?
A. Just going to say during that time I Mr. Finley was
up and about and capable I went down for a few board
meetings but was not a large amount of time.
THE COURT:
MR. YOUNG:

Anything further?
Just one questions.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. YOUNG
Q.
You indicated that you were not allowed to meet
with the consultants from New York and you tell me what
it was that prevented you from doing that?
A. Jim Burr had as part of the Consulting Agreement
indicated that he was bringing in some New York people
to work on an equity sale of the company either a stock
issue or something I am not sure what they had in mind
as an initial assignment in my Consulting Agreement he
17

had wanted me to meet with them.
^hey were meeting
with Lew Tippetts and I asked Lew Titopetts on several
occasions should I become involved [ can I meet with
them and was essentially told, well let's wait now is
not the right time and there never was a right time. I
was not allowed to even be introduced to those people.
One time when I was there and it would have been very
practical for them to get to meet me.
Q. And that what prevented you from ijieeting with them?
A. Well I could have gone in to the office and said
that here I am and I am so and so bu|t I did honor the
office protocol of honoring Lewis' dffice and he and
Jim meeting with these people. (Tr. 2+9-222)
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